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CAFETERIA

WORKERS REVISITED:

DOES THE COMMANDER HAVE PLENARY
POWER TO CONTROL ACCESS TO HIS BASE?
LIEUTENANT JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, JAGC, USNR*

The Supreme Court's decision in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy
(1961) has often been cited by military commanders to support claimed
plenary power over access to the installation commanded. Observing
that plenary power is a rarity in contemporary society, Lieutenant
Lieberman questions the proferred interpretationof Cafeteria Workers particularly in light of more recent decisions. He concludes that
while commanders do possess broad powers over access, the power
is not plenary but must be weighed in each instance against the individual's rights of freedom of speech and association.

N A POLITICAL society of checks and balances in which the electorate has historically
been expanding and a Bill of Rights expansively maintained, the existence of pockets of
plenary governmental power is not only politically dubious but also fraught with legal tension.
That plenary governmental power bound by neither procedural nor substantive restrictions is
not the usual rule in the United States should not
be surprising. The power of Congress to exclude
aliens from our shores may be an instance of
absolute Federal authority. The power of a military commander to control access to his base or
installation may be another; so, at least since
1961, have military commanders, buttressed by
the Supreme Court's decision in Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), often
insisted.
Established doctrines have a way of being

*Lieutenant Lieberman is currently serving as Head of the Legislation Branch, Administrative Law Division, Office of the Judge
Advocate General. He holds a B.A. Degree from Yale University and
the J.D. Degree from Harvard Law School. He is admitted to practice before the New York Court of Appeals, the U.S. District Court
(D.D.C.), and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals. His fourth book
was published in August.

liberalized or distorted in an era of climactic
change. Today's political confrontation in many
arenas-young and old, political and non-political, conservative and liberal, military and civilian-poses or doubtless will soon pose a direct
challenge to the holders of unfettered power.
The military is not immune; indeed, it is at the
center of the battle.
Today the military commander is faced with
a perplexing variety of situations in which civilians insist on their right to enter a military
reservation, a right the commander may be reluctant to recognize. The youth with shoulderlength hair, the housewife on whose car is affixed a peace or ecology symbol, the civilian
minister who seeks to counsel military prisoners
to resist military authority, and the civilian
worker with known antiwar beliefs all pose
problems for the commander who is convinced
that a decision to permit them access to his base
will be detrimental to the order and discipline
which must necessarily prevail on an installation. The legal basis for the decision to exclude
is invariably said to be a simple one: the Supreme Court has said the commander may do so.
Since Cafeteria Workers is the beginningand often the end--of analysis, a review of that
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case ir "ffr.O i."c tc 5cak its meaning Lnd
limits, if any.
The circumstances of the case in brief: a
short-order cook at the Naval Gun Factory in
Washington, D.C., was asked for the return of
her identification badge for an undisclosed failure to meet the security requirements of the
installation. The Gun Factory was a highly
sensitive military post: because personnel there
designed, produced, and inspected naval ordnance, including "weapons systems of a highly
classified nature," all employees were required
to be cleared for security, and access was strictly
controlled. Mrs. Brawner worked at a cafeteria
operated by M & M Restaurants, Inc., her employer. M & M operated the cafeteria by virtue
of a contract with the Gun Factory; the contract provided that failure "to meet the security
requirements or other requirements under applicable regulations of the activity, as determined by the Security Officer" of the Gun Factory would result in exclusion. The commander
upheld the security officer's determination that
the contractual provisions should come into
play, denied a request for a hearing because it
would "serve no useful purpose," and Mrs.
Brawner's badge was taken from her and access to the base denied her. M & M offered her
employment in another restaurant in the suburban area, but asserting inconvenience of the
location, she declined and brought suit to compel access to her former job. The Court held
against her.
I. THE TEACHING OF CAFETERIA WORKERS

At various times, Cafeteria Workers has been
said to stand for at least three propositions:
(1) the commander has plenary power to control access; (2) the exclusion of a civilian without a hearing is not a constitutional denial of
due process; and (3) the courts are without the
power to review exclusion orders based on the
assertion that admission would prejudice morale
and discipline.' The three "holdings" are interrelated, and are discussed here in order of
ascending difficulty.
A. Judicial Review
The third asserted holding, that courts may
not review exclusion orders based on good order
and discipline, is simply erroneous. The order
in Cafeteria Workers itself was not related to
the effect that Mrs. Brawner would have on
the working atmosphere within the Naval Gun

Factory. It was premised solely on the determination that she failed to meet the essential
security requirements of the installation. Moreover, at no point in the discussion does the
Supreme Court majority even hint that it or
any other court should have dismissed the case
for want of jurisdiction or standing. To the contrary, the court implicitly suggests its power to
review by stating that the exclusion without a
hearing was proper "when the reason advanced
was, as here, entirely rational." Orders not entirely rational, or not in accord with the
commander's own regulations, 2 are presumably
subject to judicial review to insure that what
minimal standards were established by Cafeteria Workers are in fact followed. For the
Court noted, though it does not appear to have
held, that exclusion would not have been constitutional had the stated reasons therefor been
"patently arbitrary or discriminatory"-in the
famous example, had Mrs. Brawner been a
Democrat or a Methodist. Where arbitrary or
discriminatory application of an otherwise lawful power is a possibility, the power of judicial
review will not be denied.
B. Right to d Hearing
If the Court did not seem to extinguish all
possibility of judicial review, it unquestionably
narrowed the scope of that review so as to
render it nearly superfluous. For the gist of the
Court's decision was that so long as the commander does not announce grounds that are
patently arbitrary or discriminatory but rather
states reasons that are entirely rational, he is
under no constitutional compulsion to offer a
hearing to affected persons in order to justify
the determination reached. This means, in operative terms, that so long as the reason for
exclusion is couched in proper terminology, the
courts may not inquire beneath the surface. As
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote in dissent:
The mere assertion by government that exclusion is
for a valid reason forecloses further inquiry. That is,
unless the government official is foolish enough to
admit what he is doing-and few will be so foolish
after today's decision-he may employ "security requirements" as a blind behind which to dismiss at
will for the most discriminatory of causes.'

But there can be no doubt that, at the present
time, an administrative hearing is not constitutionally necessary to sustain the exclusion order,

2. Greene v.

1,Brief for the Appellee, pp. 25-32,Bridges v. Davis (9th Cir. 1970
No. 25317).

JAG JOURNAL

McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959):

898.

2. Cafeteria

Workers at 900.

Cafeteria Workers

at

for the facts in Cafeteria Workers strongly suggest how weak the Government's interest in excluding Mrs. Brawner probably was. She was
not branded a "security risk," there was no evidence that she would be unable to work on any
other military installation, there was no evidence of intentional wrongdoing, and she was
only a cook. Nevertheless, the Court found no
deprivation of due process absent a hearing.
A word of caution is due at this point. For
the Court's analysis of the constitutional question was extraordinary, because it was ipsie
dixit rather than logical, and ipsie dixits do not
necessarily remain law forever. The Court noted
that "it has become a settled principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing
officer." 4 But the Court necessarily recognized
immediately that the proposition just stated
was not true, since the Federal Government may
not constitutionally discharge an employee because of race or religion. 5 The Court went on to
say that the recognized constitutional limitation
of the general proposition did not lead to a hearing requirement. But the cases that established
the limitation were not concerned with the issue
of a hearing, nor are the purposes to be served
in imposing a constitutional prohibition against
discrimination necessitated by the right to a
hearing. Quite the contrary: the exact issue
was whether, given the limitation, a hearing was
necessary to protect it, and this issue the Court
simply ducked by begging the question. Because
the issue had not been argued in a previous case
does not conclude the matter; indeed, Cafeteria
Workers was the ideal vehicle for an analysis
that is entirely lacking. Having found no previous discussion, the Court illogically concluded
no discussion at all was warranted. Nevertheless, to reiterate, Cafeteria Workers did hold
that denial of a hearing is not denial of due
process.
C. Power to Exclude
The major portion of Cafeteria Workers was
devoted to analysis of the power of the commander to exclude. This power the Court found
without difficulty, and it was not disputed by the
dissenters. But constant semantic shifting by
the Court majority makes opaque the extent of
the power. The Court said that the applicable
4. Id. at 896, and citing Vitarelli v. Seaton. 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959).
for the proposition that a Federal civilian employee who was
not covered by the Civil Service Act "could have been summarily
discharged by the Secretary at any time without the giving of
a reason.'"
5. Citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

Navy Regulation (Article 0734) "made absolute
the commanding officer's power to withdraw
[Mrs. Brawner's] permission to enter the Gun
Factory at any time." The Court subsequently
limited the power by observing that "patently
arbitrary or discriminatory" exclusion would be
impermissible. Hence, the net holding of Cafeteria Workers is that the commander has the
power to exclude anyone from his base assuming
that he follows any regulations he or higher
authority has promulgated to effect the
exclusion, and assuming that the reason for
exclusion is neither patently arbitrary nor
discriminatory.
II. THE WEAKNESS OF CAFETERIA WORKERS

A clear implication of Cafeteria Workers is
the judicial presumption that the commander acted in good faith. When he excluded
Mrs. Brawner from the Gun Factory because
of her failure to meet "security requirements,"
it did not appear from any evidence discussed
by either the majority or dissenters that there
was any suspicion Mrs. Brawner was excluded
because she was in fact a "Democrat or a
Methodist." "For all that appears," said
Mr. Justice Stewart for the majority, "the
Security Officer and the Superintendent may
have simply thought that Rachel Brawner was
garrulous, or careless with her identification
badge." The dissent was grounded in large
part on disagreement with the presumption of
good faith, for as Mr. Justice Brennan said in
dissent: "Under today's holding she is entitled
to no process at all . . . . She may be the victim
of the basest calumny, perhaps even the caprice
of the government officials in whose power her
status rested completely." 7
The disagreement between the majority and
dissenting opinions appears stark, but there is a
possible line of reconciliation. For, as noted
above, Cafeteria Workers did not rule out relief through judicial review where arbitrary
exclusion can be shown. In other words,
Mrs. Brawner had the burden of proof, she
adduced no evidence to suggest she had been
treated arbitrarily, and failing that proof there
was no reason to conclude that the commander
had acted other than properly. This line of
approach is not explicit because as the issues
were framed, the Court addressed only two
questions: whether the commander had the
disputed power and whether any right secured
6. Cafeteria Workers at 899.
7. Id. at 901.
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by the Constitution was denied. The latter issue,
absent evidence of arbitrariness, did not permit
a discussion of the content of those exclusions
which would be considered "patently arbitrary
or discriminatory."
Two questions are involved in any inquiry
into such content: (1) does any set of allegations exist which, if true, would permit the
commander to conclude that the applicant was
a "security risk"?; and (2) are the allegations
true? The purpose of an administrative hearing,
of course, would be to set forth on the record
the allegations-e.g., that Mrs. Brawner was
garrulous or careless with her badge (in order
to quell any notion that the exclusion was aimed
at her religious belief) -and to permit a showing that the allegations were not simply slanderously communicated to the commander out of
spite, blackmail, or a heedless disregard for the
truth.
The weakness of Cafeteria Workers becomes
apparent. For though no one is entitled to an
administrative hearing, nothing in Cafeteria
Workers precludes a court from reviewing the
exclusion if the presumption of good faith is
rebutted. This does not mean that a court would
review a commander's determination that the
allegations are true nor the determination that
those failing to meet "security requirements"
should be excluded; but it does mean that a
court may well question whether the allegations,
assumed to be true, are such as would constitutionally permit an exclusion order to stand; that
is. whether the assumed facts may constitutionally be the basis for the judgment that the
security requirement is not met. In other words,
the reviewing court can be neither the trier of
facts nor the promulgator of general rules for
the protection of military interests, but it will
examine the critical nexus between the facts
and the rule at the point of application.
III. TIlE APPLICATION OF CAFETERIA WORKERS

To test the application of the foregoing suggestion, assume the following set of facts. A
civilian woman and former WAC who works
aboard an Army base at the credit union tells
an officer in a "casual" conversation that she is
to chair near Chicago an antiwar peace rally of
servicemen and veterans. The next day she
hands out literature concerning the rally near,
but not inside, a naval station some eight miles
from the Army installation. When she returns
to the Army base that evening her car is
searched, and upon discovery of 50 pounds of
such literature the sentries remove her from the
base. Four days later she receives written notice
JAG JOURNAL

from the post commander that she is henceforth
barred from entry on the stated ground that he
believes her possession of the literature indicates
she would in the future distribute the material
in violation of a post regulation prohibiting such
activities. The credit union discharges her from
her job.
She brings suit. What result? A three judge
panel of the Seventh Circuit, in Kiiskila v.
Nichols,' held on the authority of Cafeteria
Workers that the exclusion order was valid. But
distinctions between Kiiskila and Cafeteria
Workers indicate that the result is not ineluctable, as the Seventh Circuit's en banc reversal
pointedly demonstrates.
First, Cafeteria Workers concerned an exclusion based on "security." Kiiskila, and most contemporary problems relating to access, deal with
the protection of order and discipline, a different
interest. Second, and more importantly, in
CafeteriaWorkers the commander gave no facts
to justify his conclusion that Mrs. Brawner
failed to meet "security requirements" whereas
in Kiiskila the commander stated explicitly what
facts grounded his conclusion that Miss Kiiskila
was a threat to base discipline. Third, unlike
Cafeteria Workers, Kiiskila contains facts
which tend to rebut the presumption favoring
the commander.
As to the first distinction-security vs. base
discipline-the authority of the commander to
issue regulations to protect either interest is not
questioned. But it is suggested here that courts,
in reviewing exclusionary orders, will be less
inclined to let a commander hide behind a
declaration ex cathedra that a civilian is a
threat to discipline than a threat to security.
That is, given a determination that a person is
a threat to discipline, without further explanation, may raise a presumption, contra Cafeteria
Workers, of arbitrariness.
Second, when the commander states how his
regulations applied to the facts yield an exclusion order, the reviewing court suddenly has
a basis for reversal if the application is arbitrary-that is, the commander's explanation
supplies the court with sufficient information to
decide the validity of the administrative determination. Note that the second distinction does
not obviate the need, from the plaintiff's perspective, for an administrative hearing, since
(Continued on page 61)

8. 38 U.S.L.W. 2450 (7th Cir. 1970), reversed No. 17580
1970) (e. b-ne).

(7th Cir.

military judge before whom the accused's case
is heard. The revision incorporates the Federal
civilian standard of a presumption of release
and requires the judge to list his reasons for a
denial of deferment in writing. A denial would
be appealable to the Court of Military Review.
The deferment could be rescinded by the judge
"for cause." 1,3This provision, if enacted, would
bring the deferment system much closer to the
Bail Reform Act. Congress' reaction to this proposed provision will demonstrate just how
"similar to" the civilian bail system it intended
deferment of confinement to be, and will also
reflect its assessment of how well the present
system is working.
It is likely that military commanders would
prefer to retain the present system. Transfer of
the deferment decision to the military judge
with a presumption of release would probably
result in many cases in an adversary proceeding
in which the command would have the burden
of overcoming the presumption. Article 57(d),
as presently written, squarely places the burden
on the accused to justify his release. The proposed system would, therefore, increase the
command's workload. It might also result in a
commander's having to accept for duty individuals whom he considered to be disciplinary
threats and whose confinement he personally
would not have deferred. It is suggested that
more relaxed deferment provisions would be
much more palatable to commanders if corollary
provisions gave them the authority to impose
conditions designed to insure presence for ultimate sentence execution. For instance, if a
system could be designed with coordination
through local law enforcement officials and
parents whereby a practical guarantee of return
could be made, it might be feasible in some instances to apply deferment by sending the member home on leave without pay pending final case
review.
Argument about the merits of proposed revisions aside, it is clear that by enacting Article 57 (d) Congress intended to give the accused
a substantial opportunity to demonstrate a case
63. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 857(d) (1970): "'(d) On application by an accused who is under sentence to confinement that
has not been ordered executed, the military judge detailed to
the trial of the accused may defer service of the sentence to
confinement. Deferment shall be granted unless it affirmatively
appears likely that the accused would flee to avoid confinement
or would be a danger to the military or civilian community. Denial
of deferment shall be accompanied by a written statement signed
by the military judge who granted it. A denial of the application of an accused for deferment of service of sentence pending
appeal of his conviction may be appealed by the accused, as an
interlocutory matter, to the Court of Military Review.' "

for freedom during the appellate process, and
is likely to become impatient with the present
system if it fails in practice to afford that opportunity. Therefore, it would appear to constitute enlightened self-interest on the part of
commanders wishing to retain the present system to exercise reasonable liberality in its
operation.

CAF. WORKERS
(Continued from page 56)

under Cafeteria Workers the court must accept
as true the facts recited in the commander's
explanation. The court cannot review the weight
of the evidence. But it may perform the task
for which it is historically suited-namely, reviewing the commander's application of his
concededly lawful regulations to his necessarily
accepted facts to determine whether he has
acted in a "patently arbitrary or discriminatory" manner.
The third distinction between Kiiskila and
Cafeteria Workers merely supports the force of
the second. For the existence of facts in the
record concerning appellant's activities may
suggest to the court it need be less apprehensive
that it will upset important interests than
where those interests are cloaked in an impenetrable veil of mystery.
The questions remain, then, what disposition
the Seventh Circuit might have made of Kiiskila
had it not read Cafeteria Workers so woodenly;
and what disposition courts might make in the
future of cases involving discipline and order
on military bases.
The answer to the first question is at hand,
having been supplied by the Seventh Circuit
itself. The exclusion order "and the concomitant
loss of her civilian employment violated her
rights to freedom of speech and association
under the first amendment." 9
The court of appeals states at the outset the
necessity of balancing Miss Kiiskila's interest
against that of the United States; it is noteworthy that though Cafeteria Workers did not
purport to be based on a weighing of interests,
language therein concerning the small harm to
Mrs. Brawner occasioned by the exclusion order
at a sensitive military installation gives support
9. Kilakila v. Nichols. No. 17580 at 4 (7th Cir. 1970).
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to the Seventh Circuit's analysis. In undertaking a balancing test, the court holds that the
exclusion order in Kiiskila "is essentially equivalent to dismissal of a person from government
employment." In The court went on to note the
"particularly great emphasis [which] must be
placed on the interest of society in encouraging
free exchange of ideas." 11Thus,
[T]o protect society's interest in uninhibited and robust debate the first amendment demands that government be prohibited from inhibiting or suppressing
speech by indirection through discharge of a government employee when the same objective could not constitutionally be achieved by criminal sanctions or other
direct means."
13

In United States v. Robel, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional an act which subjected a member of the Communist Party to
criminal prosecution for continued employment
at a "defense facility." The Act, said the Court,

put [the worker] to the choice of surrendering his
organizational affiliation, regardless of whether his
membership threatened the security of a defense
The statute quite
facility, or giving up his job ....
literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government in
proscribing it. The inhibiting effect on the exercise
of the First Amendment rights is clear.'

This case arose not as the result of a denial
of a hearing: the worker was indicted and the
case heard in Federal district court. The Supreme Court, in voiding, based its holding on the
constitutional determination that the Government has no power to premise exclusions on such
a vague basis.
It is arguable that when the only penalty is
dismissal from a Federal job, predicated on
exclusion from the military base, cases dealing
with the imposition of criminal penalties are
inapposite. The Seventh Circuit held otherwise.
Since the Court's decision in Spevack v. Klein,1
to which the Seventh Circuit does not advert, a
Government job may not be conditioned on a
waiver of constitutional rights. Then-Chief
Justice Holmes' old and oft-quoted holding that
a man may have the constitutional right to talk
politics but does not have the right to be a

I0. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
12. Kiiskila v. Nichols. No. 17580 at 6 (7(h Cir. 1970).
13. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
14. Id. of 265.
15. 385 U.S. 511 (1967); see also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967).
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policeman- is no longer good law, as the
Seventh Circuit in a disparaging tone realizes.
It follows, therefore, that though the right to
hold a job on a military installation is by no
means absolute, it cannot be denied upon the
refusal of a worker to forego a constitutional
right. An exclusion so predicated amounts to the
"patently arbitrary and discriminatory" action
condemned in Cafeteria Workers.
Against the constitutional right to engage in
antiwar demonstrations outside a military
reservation, the court could find set forth no
''overwhelming countervailing state interest
peculiarly pertaining to plaintiff's job." 11 The
Government argued that Miss Kiiskila's job inside a military reservation distinguished her
case from cases concerning public employment
generally. The court noted the absence of evidence demonstrating that Miss Kiiskila's presence on base or her off-base activities affected
military discipline. The Government's contention was characterized as "a broad claim that
undefined military and national defense considerations are sufficient to permit the Government to infringe plaintiff's rights to freedom of
speech and association," Is a claim rejected19by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Robel.
The Government argued that public employment may be predicated on a foregoing of otherwise protected speech that would impair the
ability of a person to carry out his job. The
court dismissed the contention without analysis
because Kiiskila's speech did not relate to her
job at the credit union nor did the Government
introduce evidence on the point. The Government also argued that the commander's fear
that plaintiff would engage in antiwar activity
on the base in violation of a post regulation
justified the exclusion order. The court replied,
citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District:20
"In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression." Thus, unless we are to permit the deprivation of constitutional rights through
subterfuge, the validity of a commanding officer's exclusion of a civilian employee from a military installation must turn upon more than his own subjective
statements of the reason for his action.21
16. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford. 155 Mass. 216. 220, 29 N.E.
517 (1892).
17. Kiiskila v. Nichols, No. 17580 at 7 (7th Cir. 1970).
18. Id.
19. Supra note 13 at 263-4: "The phrase 'war power' cannot be
invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of
congressional power which can be brought within its amhit."
20. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
21. Kiiskila v. Nichols. No. 17580 at t-9 (7th Cir. 1970).

It is important to note explicitly what Kiiskila
II did not say. It did not say "off-the-base conduct can never be considered in determining the
validity of an exclusion order." 2 In fact, if the
Government could have proved that off-base
conduct "directly and imminently foreshadows
proscribed on-the-base activity" it could be used,
the court says, "in determining the likelihood
that plaintiff will violate post regulations." 23
But if it is important to recognize the limits of
this case, it is even more important to realize
how far the Seventh Circuit did go in limiting
the power of commanders to exclude. For the
Seventh Circuit did not merely rely on a vaguely
asserted constitutional right to talk; it held expressly that the commander had failed to prove
what real-not merely hypothetical-effects
plaintiff's activity would have on military personnel. The ramifications of this holding may
eventually strike deep, as cases concerning long
hair, symbols on automobiles, and other instances of allegedly disruptive activity are
tested in the courts. In this day of accelerating
dissent and attack against the prevailing view
of things, it can be confidently expected that
similar issues will arise again. It is important
for commanders to realize that nothing in the
law precludes a court from examining his
reasons for exclusion. If commanders are aware
of the fluidity of the legal situation they may
be able to keep the change of course within
narrow limits. But if they insist on a too-hearty
reliance on Cafeteria Workers as dispositive,
the change will be dramatic and discomfiting
when it comes. Those who act reasonably will
be treated reasonably, and the power to maintain order and discipline, though it will not be
plenary, will remain intact.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id.

COMP. GEN.
(Continued from page 34)
provides also that a new form will be prepared when a
change occurs which affects certain information on the
current form, including a change in the name of a
beneficiary.
Therefore, in order to change his beneficiary, a member of the Marine Corps must execute and sign a new

Record of Emergency Data Form and forward it to the
specified Marine Corps office. Such was not accomplished
in this case and, while the sergeant may have been improperly advised of the Marine Corps requirements for
changing the beneficiary, and as a possible consequence
of that advice failed properly to execute and file the
beneficiary change prior to his death, such facts afford
no basis to pay any amount due to any person other than
the beneficiary on record. Accordingly, as the sergeant's
pending beneficiary change was not, at the time of his
death, completed, signed and processed according to law
and regulations, the change had no legal force and effect.
(Comp. Gen. Decision B-168397 of December 22, 1969.)
PAY AND ALLOWANCES-Travel and transportation allowances
upon an emergency recall from leave of five or more days duration. Proposed amendment to Paragraph M6601-1 of the Joint
Travel Regulations iTR) is not objectionable in providing for
reimbursement for return travel due to a recall from leave under
emergency conditions, notwithstanding the length of time a
member has been on leave.
* The Secretary of the Navy requested that the Comptroller General rule as to whether Paragraph M6601-1
of the JTR may be amended to grant reimbursement for
travel expenses incurred by service members who are
recalled under urgent and unforeseen circumstances
from authorized leave of five days or more. Paragraph.
M6601-1 now provides that such reimbursement may be
made only when the member is recalled within 24 hours
after his departure in a leave status. The proposed
change would provide for reimbursement for travel regardless of the number of the days the member has been
in a leave status.
The Comptroller General stated that the reasoning
set forth in 46 Comp. Gen. 210(1966) applies in this
instance. In that case, the Comptroller General sanctioned the provisions of M6601-1 as it now appears in
the JTR in regard to payment of travel expenses for
members recalled from leave due to urgent or unforeseen
circumstances within 24 hours after the service member's departure on leave. An element of "public interest"
was found to exist in such a circumstance.
The Comptroller General reiterated that the emergency conditions brought about by contingency operations or emergency war operations requiring the recall
of service members from leave involve an element of
"public business." Therefore, expenses for such return
travel due to a termination of leave are reimbursable,
if pursuant to appropriate regulation. Accordingly, the
Comptroller General could perceive no objection to the
proposed change to Paragraph M6601-1 which would
authorize payment for travel for members recalled under
emergency conditions from a leave of five or more days
duration notwithstanding the length of time the member has been on leave. (Comp. Gen. Decision B-159680
of May 27, 1970.)
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